The hypothesis that cues related to subjects' current concerns can control attentional and cognitive processes during sleeping and dreaming was examined by presenting concern-and nonconcern-related verbal stimuli to seven male subjects during sleep Stages 2 and REM. The taped dream reports were judged for stimulus incorporation by two independent raters. The results revealed that concern stimuli were incorporated significantly more often than nonconcern stimuli in Stage REM, although low dream recall rates prevented assessment of whether this relationship also existed in Stage 2. This rinding supports the results of a number of other studies which indicate that responsiveness to auditory stimuli during sleeping and dreaming is largely dependent on the personal significance of the stimulus to the sleeper. It further suggests that sleeping subjects are capable of making more complex and subtle cognitive discriminations, based on the waking value of the stimulus to the subject, than has previously been demonstrated.
The hypothesis that cues related to subjects' current concerns can control attentional and cognitive processes during sleeping and dreaming was examined by presenting concern-and nonconcern-related verbal stimuli to seven male subjects during sleep Stages 2 and REM. The taped dream reports were judged for stimulus incorporation by two independent raters. The results revealed that concern stimuli were incorporated significantly more often than nonconcern stimuli in Stage REM, although low dream recall rates prevented assessment of whether this relationship also existed in Stage 2. This rinding supports the results of a number of other studies which indicate that responsiveness to auditory stimuli during sleeping and dreaming is largely dependent on the personal significance of the stimulus to the sleeper. It further suggests that sleeping subjects are capable of making more complex and subtle cognitive discriminations, based on the waking value of the stimulus to the subject, than has previously been demonstrated.
Research on the determinants of waking thought content (Klinger, 1978) has demonstrated the influence of current concerns on cognitive processes. The concept of current concern refers to the state of an organism between the time it becomes committed to a particular goal and the consummation or abandonment of the goal. During dichotic listening, cues related to subjects' current concerns exerted a controlling effect on attention, recall, and thought content. The present investigation seeks to extend these findings to effects of concernrelated cues on dream content.
Responsiveness to external stimulation has been shown to occur in sleeping subjects. Subjects can be induced to perform physical acts in response to cues introduced while they are asleep (Evans, Gustafson, O'Connell, Orne, & Shor, 1970; Oswald, Taylor, & Treisman, 1960; Williams, Morlock, & Morlock, 1966) . Both the cues and the responses used in these investigations varied considerably: stereotyped hand movements to taperecorded names (Oswald et al., 1960) , overlearned natural responses to suggestions about subjects' physical states, such as scratching one's nose in response to the suggestion that it was itchy (Evans et al., 1970) , or finger movements in response to conditioned auditory stimuli (Williams et al., 1966) . These studies make clear that sleeping sub-jects continue to process information from external sources and can perform motor responses to them. Other investigations have shown the personal significance of cues to influence sleeper's physiological activity (tape-recorded names and EEG K-complexes: Oswald et al., 1960 ; names and finger plethysmograph, heart rate, and Kcomplexes: McDonald, Schicht, Frazier, Shallenberger, & Edwards, 1975) and awakening latency (Langford, Meddis, & Pearson, 1974) . In these latter investigations, the critical stimuli were the subjects' own names as contrasted with other people's names, their own names played backwards, or neutral tones. Thus, these studies demonstrate that sleepers process and screen for personally relevant cues. Subjects' own names are doubtless associated with powerful current concerns, but own names are also peculiarly well-learned and emotionally laden stimuli. These results do not, therefore, probe very far the limits of processing. Furthermore, those studies using own names did not investigate the influence of cues on the flow of sleeping mental activity.
One investigation that did sample dream content played names of subjects' current or past friends and neutral names (Berger, 1963) and reported no difference in the rate with which the two groups of names were incorporated into dreams. However, the investigator did not analyze separately for names of current versus past friends, and most similarities between names and dream content took the form of assonances, which probably involve a lower level of response organization than semantic content and are governed by different determinants. Finally, each stimulus was repeated approximately 12 times before an awak-ening, which may have produced some habituation. Thus, these results need not be interpreted as inconsistent with the hypothesis of the present investigation.
The studies described above collectively suggest that sleeping subjects are able to process cognitively meaningful stimuli and that current concerns may exert control on attentional and cognitive processes during sleeping and dreaming. The present experiment tests this hypothesis by examining the effect of concern-versus nonconcern-related verbal stimuli on dream content in Stages 2 and REM. In contrast to previous investigators' use of subjects' own names, the verbal cues employed here represent considerably more subtle variations in conditioned affectivity and depend for their meaning to subjects on finergrained cognitive processing.
Method

Subjects
Seven male undergraduate students recruited from an introductory psychology class reported to the sleep laboratory for four consecutive evenings. All subjects were paid $10 per evening and were naive as to the experimental hypothesis.
Stimuli
Concern-related stimuli were obtained from an adapted version of Klinger's Concern Dimensions Questionnaire (CDQ; Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980 , in press) completed on subjects' arrival on the first evening. The CDQ had subjects list 10 "things" (generally significant concerns) in their lives, five that they had been thinking about most during the past 2 days and five that they had thought about very little or not at all. The subjects then wrote a brief description of each concern, chose one or two words that best identified each concern, and rated each concern on a commitment scale that ranged from 1 (no commitment or intention of pursuing the concern) to 6 (full intention or commitment). Nonconcernrelated stimuli were obtained by presenting to the subjects a list of another person's 10 concern descriptions. Subjects were instructed to choose one or two words that best identified each of the other person's concerns and to rate their personal commitment to those concerns. This procedure assured that the nonconcerns chosen for each subject were not, by coincidence, a concern of that subject. Having subjects process nonconcern stimuli along with concern stimuli also served to reduce the difference between the two kinds of stimuli in the extent to which subjects would be sensitized to them or primed for associations to them by recent exposure to them on the CDQ.
The concern-and nonconcern-related stimuli consisted of the one-or two-word identification of their concerns and nonconcerns and were chosen according to their commitment ratings (Klinger et al., 1980, in press ). Postexperimental analyses revealed no significant difference in the average number of syllables or in the frequency of usage according to Thorndike-Lorge (1944) norms between the concern and nonconcern stimuli. Each stimulus was tape-recorded by having a male reader, naive as to whether the word(s) was concern-or nonconcern-related, repeat the stimulus word(s) three times at 2-sec intervals. An awakening tone was taped 8 sec after the third repetition of the stimulus.
Apparatus
The subjects slept in a darkened, electrically shielded Industrial Acoustics Corporation 1202A audiometric room. A speaker and microphone placed on a chair approximately 4 feet (1.2 m) from the subject's head allowed the experimenter to communicate with the subject at all times. Beckman EEG disc scalp electrodes and Beckman silver-silver chloride miniature skin electrodes were used with a Beckman Type R Dynograph set at a paper speed of 10 mm/sec to record Electroencephalogram (EEG) and Electrooculogram (EOG) activity.
Procedure
The first night was an adaptation evening designed to acclimate subjects to the experimental setting and acquaint them with the dream-reporting procedure. Data were collected on the following three evenings.
A variable-interval schedule, set with intervals ranging from 30 to 90 minutes, went into effect 1 hour after the subject was left alone in the sleeping cubicle. Ten minutes prior to each scheduled awakening, the polygraph was turned on and the stage of sleep was determined. Trials were initiated only when the subject was in an unambiguous Stage 2 or REM period. If the subject was not in Stage 2 or REM, the trial was delayed until he clearly moved into Stage 2 or REM. The taped stimulus, played at a soft speaking-voice intensity, and subsequent awakening tone were then played over the speaker and marked on the polygraph record. If the verbal stimulation produced discernable EEG arousal before the end of stimulation on a trial, the trial was terminated before the awakening tone. Thus, the indicated sleep stage for a trial is that within which stimulation took place. On the subject's awakening, a tape recorder was turned on and the subject was asked, "What was going through your head?" Some clar-ification questions were occasionally necessary for vague dream reports, but the experimenter tried to follow a standard questioning format in order to avoid any possible insinuation of the stimulus word(s). After the report, the subject was asked "Were you aware of anything outside of your mental experience since your last report?" (In the one case in which the subject reported hearing the stimulus word, the trial was discarded.) The subject also rated the visual, auditory, and affective (positive, neutral, or negative) quality of his dream and the depth of sleep before the awakening, using four-level scales (except for the threelevel scale for affect) devised by Rechtschaffen (Note 1). Immediately after the report, the next variable interval period went into effect. The order of the concern-and nonconcern-related stimuli was randomly determined, although the experimenter did occasionally alter the random schedule (most commonly during the last evening) so that the four conditions (Type of Cue X Sleep Stage) would have an approximately equal number of trials. At no time, however, was a stimulus used more than once per evening.
The above procedure yielded 5 to 7 awakenings per evening and 15 to 18 awakenings per subject over the three testing evenings. Trials were also divided as equally as possible over the four conditions: (a) Stage 2, Concern; (b) Stage 2, Nonconcern; (c) REM, Concern; and (d) REM, Nonconcern. This division provided for three to five trials per condition for each subject.
Scoring
Two student judges aware of the experimental hypothesis but blind as to which stimuli were concern-related for a particular subject rated the taped dream reports for stimulus incorporation. The scoring instructions were explicit and addressed three types of thematic incorporation: (a) presence of the stimulus in the dream report; (b) reference to the stimulus by synonymous language (e.g., "dad" for "father"); and (c) metaphoric parallels or thematic similarities to the CDQ descriptions of the concern or nonconcern represented by the stimulus. Interrater reliability of stimulus incorporation judgments was reflected in a proportion of agreement of .94, compared to a chance agreement level of .67, f(73) = 3.42, p < .005. A control analysis to determine the specific effects of stimuli on dream content consisted of judging "incorporations" of stimuli in dream reports obtained before the introduction of the stimuli being judged.
Results
Altogether, 50 Stage 2 and 59 Stage REM trials were conducted, with mentation reported on 95% of the REM awakenings and only 34% of the Stage 2 awakenings. The two judges scored 14 instances of incorporation, 11 of which involved concern stimuli. All but one of the 14 incorporations occurred in REM.
Incorporation percentages were calculated for each subject by dividing the number of judged incorporations by the number of trials with mentation for each of the four conditions, The use of individual-subject rates was necessary to avoid confounding intersubject and intrasubject variance. Using REM trials only, a two-way (Cue Type X Subject) analysis of variance revealed significantly greater incorporation of concern stimuli (34%) than of nonconcern stimuli, 11%; F(l, 6) = 6.08, p < .05.
Since people are presumed by theory to dream about concerns rather than nonconcerns, one would expect higher "incorporation" baselines for concerns, quite apart from the experimental stimuli. We therefore performed a control analysis that paired each REM stimulus with a preceding (rather than immediately following) dream report in order to compare the number of "chance" incorporations for the concern and nonconcern stimuli. Five concern and three nonconcern stimuli were judged to be incorporated by the two raters in the control analysis, F(l, 6) = 0.50, p < .25. In a two-way analysis of variance (Stimulus/ Dream Order X Subject) on concern stimuli only, there was a significant difference between the proportion of concern stimuli judged to be incorporated into dreams following the stimuli than into dreams preceding the stimuli, F(l, 6) = 14.64, p < .01). This finding indicates that the observed incorporations were indeed attributable to the experimental stimuli.
Stimuli were judged to have been incorporated into 23% of the REM trials in which subjects reported some mentation but into only 6% of the Stage 2 trials. Although the single stage 2 incorporation occurred after a concern related stimulus, this difference was not, of course, statistically significant for Stage 2 alone. Since the direction of the cue type effect was similar at both sleep stages, the Cue Type X Sleep Stage interaction was also nonsignificant.
Evidence of arousal on the EEG and EOG record during the 8-sec interval between each trial's last stimulus presentation and the awakening signal occurred in 12% of the REM trials, including 23% of the trials in which stimulus incorporation occurred and 10% of the nonincorporation trials, a difference that is not significant (p = .67) by Fisher Exact Test. There was only one spontaneous awakening, which was not accompanied by stimulus incorporation. Arousal generally took the form of short bursts of alpha rhythm (mean of 2.8 sec on the trials containing any alpha) that are not uncommon during undisturbed REM sleep. Thus, the incorporation rates reported cannot be explained by arousal. Similarly, the ratio of concern-to nonconcern-related stimuli incorporated into subjects' dreams was virtually identical in trials with alpha and in trials free of alpha.
Incorporation percentages varied considerably across subjects, ranging from 0% to 50%. Attempts to identify either other patterns or extraneous determinants of incorporation were unsuccessful. Incorporations occurred equally often across the three testing nights and subjects' length of the dream reports, self-reported affect, auditory and visual ratings, and self-reported sleep depth were all unrelated to incorporation.
Discussion
The data clearly support the hypothesis that sleeping subjects are more responsive to concernthan nonconcern-related auditory stimuli in Stage REM. The incorporation rates of 23% and 6% for REM and Stage 2 trials, respectively, tentatively suggest that auditory stimuli may be more easily incorporated in REM than in Stage 2 mentation. We were also unable to assess whether Stage 2 sleep is differentially responsive to the concern versus nonconcern nature of the stimulus, though previous work by some investigators (Langford et al., 1974; McDonald et al., 1975; Williams et al., 1966) suggests that the significance of the stimulus to the subject is an important factor in Stage 2 responsiveness.
The control analyses give strong evidence that the observed differences in stimulus incorporation in REM sleep were attributable to the nature of the stimuli rather than simply to a tendency for subjects to dream about their own concerns. These results are consistent with and extend other investigators' findings that sleeping subjects are more sensitive to personally significant than to nonsignificant stimuli (Langford et al., 1974; McDonald et al., 1975; Oswald et al., 1960; Williams et al., 1966) . The data further suggest that, at least during REM sleep, subjects are able to make subtle and complex cognitive discriminations based on the waking value of the stimulus to the subject. This evidence supports the theory (Klinger, 1971 (Klinger, , 1977 that cues related to one's current concerns exert a controlling effect on both waking and sleeping attentional and cognitive processes.
